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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ing corporations.5 It is also a prerequisite in the use of this agency
that the legal title be vested in the principal.0
There has been no adjudication as to the validity of a trustee
casting his vote by proxy in New York. However, the right of a
trustee to vote on stock so held is recognized.7 Furthermore, every-
one having stock and the right to vote on such stock stock is entitled
to vote by proxy.8 Therefore, since both these methods are valid, and
a combination of them would not produce a principle illegal in itself,
it seems logical to conclude that New York would follow the rule of
the Delaware case if the terms of the agreement permitted the voting
trustee to vote by proxy.
C. T. S.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY FiRE SPREADING TO NON-CONTIGUOUS
PREMISES.-Sun Oil Company maintained a plant for the storage of
gasoline in Syracuse. Homack Corporation owned certain buildings
across the street from this plant. A fire started on the premises of
the Sun Oil Company and was transmitted by direct flames, sparks
or intense heat, across intervening street free from inflammable ma-
terial, to a building of the Homack Corporation and thence spread
to other buildings on the same premises. An action was brought
by the Homack Corporation for damage caused by the fire alleged
to have negligently originated on land of Sun Oil Company who
contend they are not liable because the fire on their premises was
not the proximate cause of the damage.1 Appeal from a judgment
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court unanimously af-
firming judgment in favor of plaintiff. Held, aff'd, Homack Cor-
poration v. Sun Oil Compan.y, 258 N. Y. 462, 180 N. E. 172 (1932).
As stated in this case it is settled that when a fire negligently
starts upon land of A and spreads to land of B, an adjoining land
owner, and ignites a building and spreads to others, A is liable for
the damage to all the buildings on the land of B.2  If, however,
'Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige 590 (1829); N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW, §19;
FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, VOl. 5, §2050.
'Matter of Mohawk & Hudson R. R., 19 Wend. 135 (1838); FLETCHER,
CORPORATIONS, vol. 5, §2053.
'Matter of Barker, 6 Wend. 509 (1831).
IN. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW (1932) §19; FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, vol. 5,
§1005.
2 Ryan v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 210 (1886) ; Frace v. N. Y., L. E. &
W. R. R. Co., 143 N. Y. 182, 189, 38 N. E. 102, 103 (1894); Hoffman v. King,
160 N. Y. 618, 627, 55 N. E. 401, 403 (1899); Matter of City of New York,
209 N. Y. 344, 103 N. E. 508 (1913).
'Frace v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., .upra note 1; Hoffman v. King,
supra note 1; Davis v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 215 N. Y. 181, 109 N. E. 95
1915); Rose v. Penn R. R. Co., 236 N. Y. 568, 142 N. E. 287 (1923).
RECENT DECISIONS
the fire spreads over intervening lands, B not being an adjoining
landowner, A is not liable.3 The reason for absence of liability
when fire spreads over intervening lands being that defendant has
no control over the material on that land. Liability attaches when
the fire on defendant's land spreads to the plaintiff's without the
intervention of any intermediate agencies. Defendant disclaims lia-
bility contending that inasmuch as neither party owned any part
of the intervening street they were not adjoining landowners. 4 Al-
though a street intervened between the lands of the parties the fire
did not spread to the street and thence to the plaintiff's land but
spread directly to the land of the plaintiff so that the fire upon the
land of the defendant was the proximate cause of the destruction
of plaintiff's buildings. This decision modifies the general rule
in that it extends liability to an owner of land not adjoining plain-
tiff when the intervening land does not contribute to the spreading
of the negligent fire.
A. E. A.
PARTITION SALE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT FOR
SALE OF LAND.-A vendee at a partition sale paid 10% of the bid but
on closing day refused to perform. Six months thereafter an order
directing the vendee to take title and make payment was obtained.
On appeal the order was affirmed. The purchaser defaulted on the
day set and on subsequent adjournments. Thereafter an order of
resale, providing that the purchaser at the sale will be liable for a
deficiency, was decreed. It was never vacated or modified. Subse-
quently purchaser assigned his rights. When the property fortui-
tously enhanced in value, the assignees moved for specific perform-
ance. Order was denied. On appeal, held, the assignees were not
entitled to the relief sought. They acquired no greater rights than
the assignor possessed. Bowen v. Horgan, 259 N. Y. 267, 181 N. E.
567 (1932).
The purchaser may assign his rights under the contract, thereby
transferring the same right to specific performance that he had.1 But
at the time of the assignment the vendee did not possess the right to
specific performance, he defaulted absolutely and thereby forfeited
it.2 Hence, the assignee did not acquire this right. An assignee
3 Ibid.
'Matter of City of New York, szpra note 1; Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N.
Y. 145, 161 N. .E. 450 (1928); Monogram Development Co. v. Natben Con-
struction Co., 253 N. Y. 320, 171 N. E. 390 (1930).
' Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922) ; Langel v. Betz,
250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928).
2 Stagman v. Lasson, 345 Ill. 482, 178 N. E. 166 (1931); McDonald v.
Sautter, 346 Ill. 67, 178 N. E. 340 (1931); Haddaway v. Smith, 277 S. W. 728
(1925) (refusal to perform is a breach discharging the other party) ; Westown
Realty Co. v. Keller, 143 App. Div. 458, 128 N. Y. Supp. 518 (1st Dept. 1911).
